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Chapter 5
Hard Cases in Scripture: A Reflection on
Legal and Religious Interpretation
Paul Cliteur
This contribution is in many respects inspired by Herman Philipse's chapter in
this book. But his conclusions are exactly opposite to mine. He considers liberal
interpretation the appropriate approach in law and contends that textualism
and originalism are more fruitful in theology and religion. I defend that liberal
interpretation is more appropriate in religion and theology (perhaps even
inevitable) and textualism and originalism are more suitable for law. The reason is
that Holy Scripture cannot be amended so 'interpretation' is the only way to avoid
unacceptable results. The law, on the other hand, is amendable, so we do not have
to 'interpret' to make it up to date.
Introduction
In 1977, the American legal philosopher Ronald Dworkin published a collection
of articles under the title Taking Rights Seriously. One of those articles dealt with
'hard cases' in law (1977: 81-131). What do judges have to decide when the law
seems to offer no answer for the problem that presents itself to them in a legal
case? And what is the obligation ofjudges if adherence to the law would result in
a verdict that is morally hardly acceptable?' One of those 'hard cases' is the old
jurisprudential chestnut of Riggs v. Palmer (1889) (Dworkin 1986: 15).
The case was this. Elmer Palmer murdered his grandfather in 1882. He knew
that he was the recipient of his grandfather's large estate. However, the old man
had remarried and he probably would change his will after having done this. Elmer
decided to take action and poisoned his grandfather. Unfortunately (for Elmer, that
is), his crime was discovered and Ehner was sentenced to a term of years in jail.
Now a new question arose. That legal question was a moral problem as well: was
Elmer legally entitled to the inheritance that his grandfather's last will provided?
Hard cases are so hard because the strict application of the rules of the law would
result in a situation that we find difficult if not impossible to accept on moral
grounds.
1 A classic discussion on this theme is Hart 1958 also in Hart 1983: 49-87, Fuller
1958: 630-72, also in Feinberg et al. 1991: 82-102.
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One ofthe judges in this case was Judge Gray. Gray insisted that the real statute,
constructed in the proper way, contained no exceptions for murderers. Ifthe court
would deny the estate to Ehner this would add significant further punishment to
what Ehner received under the criminal statute. The written statutes that existed at
the time did not exclude murderers from inheritance. That pleads for Elmer. The
court cannot create or imagine such statutes simply to obtain a morally pleasing
result. So Judge Gray voted for Elmer. The majority, however, did not, and Elmer
did not receive the inheritance.
The majority opinion for the court was written by Judge Robert Earl (1868-
1894). According to Earl, Ehner should not get the inheritance. Why?
The answer is given by, among others, Ronald Dworkin who analyzed the
problem ofRiggs v. Palmer in his book Law sEmpire (1986). Dworkin sided with
the majority of 1889, revising the dominant legal positivism of his time. The law,
so Dworkin contended, was not only a system of rules (as legal positivists like
H.L.A. Hart had contended: Hart 1961), but of principles as well. A principle as
that one cannot profit from one's own wrongdoing prohibits giving Elmer the
inheritance.
The difference ofopinion between Judge Gray on the one hand and the majority
of the court and Ronald Dworkin on the other, manifests also a dispute on how
to interpret written texts. Judge Earl gives the legislator's intentions an important
influence over the real statute. Earl wrote: 'It is a familiar canon of construction
that a thing which is within the intention of the makers of a statute is as much
within the statute as if it were within the letter; and a thing which is within the
letter of the statute is not within the statute, unless it be within the intention ofthe
makers' (Dworkin 1986: 18).
The question of how to interpret authoritative texts is not only relevant for
jurisprudence. The same problems that judges and legal scholars encounter in
interpreting statutes and the Constitution also arise in other situations where texts
have to be interpreted. One can think of the literary critic trying to come to grips
with a poem.' What has W.E. Yeats meant with 'Sailing to Byzantium'? (Dworkin
1986: 17). And is it relevant what Yeats had intended?3 Another situation where
we have to deal with the interpretation of texts is theology. How should we read
Holy Scripture? The analogy between law and Holy Scripture may even be more
illuminating than between law and literature. The law, like Scripture, has authority
over us (something a poem is lacking). And just as with law, the interpretation
of Holy Scripture presents us with vexing problems: situations where our moral
sense severely clashes with what a literal interpretation of the holy text seems to
require. What are we to do in such situations? More specific: what are we to do
when Holy Scripture seems to contradict common sense, our most firm moral
convictions or civil law?
2 A classic introduction is Eagleton 1983.
3 Dworkin dwells on the comparison oflaw and literature in Dworkin 1985: 146--66
and Dworkinl982: 165-88, also in Adams 1996: 93-9.
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In this chapter I will draw mainly on some similarities between legal
interpretation and theological or religious interpretation but highlight some aspects
ofliterary interpretation as well.4
To make the comparison between legal interpretation and theological
interpretation, I need to concentrate on those parts of Holy Scripture where the
conflict between our moral convictions and the worldview of Holy Scripture
is maximal. To some this may seem one-sided if not disrespectful. Why focus
only on the problematic passages from Scripture? The sincere believer will retort
perhaps that the passages I will dwell upon are not representative of the totality
of the religious inheritance. This is undoubtedly true but, so I would argue, it is
irrelevant. I have to concentrate on 'hard cases' in law (like Elmers case) and
similar passages in the holy book because those instances in particular ignite our
creativity with regard to the question how to deal with difficult situations. I will
start with scriptural passages which deal with the topic of freedom of religion.
I do this because in contemporary societies the freedom ofreligion is considered
to be an important value. According to some scholars the freedom of religion is
the cradle of all human and civil rights (Jellinek 1927). It is enshrined in most
constitutions and treaties of human rights. Modern freedom of religion does not
only encompass the freedom to have a religion and the free exercise of it, but also
the right to change a religion for another and even relinquish all religions.'
But like the abolishment of the death penalty, the freedom of religion is a
typically modern ideal. In the ancient world it was relatively unknown or acquired
only limited acceptance. In holy books it gets scarce recognition. In this chapter I
will first highlight the position offreedom ofreligion in the Bible, more especially
in the books Deuteronomy, Judges and Numbers. Subsequently I will show the
relevance of this discussion to the topic of theological and legal interpretation.
The conclusion of my contribution will be that consistent analysis indicates
that although theological interpretation and legal interpretation have on a
superficial level much in common, they ultimately point in different directions.
A textualist and originalist approach with regard to religious scripture would lead
to draconic results. So theologians and ordinary believers are more or less forced
to adopt the device of the 'Living Scripture'. Not doing that, would make them
'fundamentalists' (people preoccupied with a literal interpretation ofthe text) and
even religious terrorists (people who are prepared to use violence if Scripture
seems to require this). With regard to legal scripture (in contrast to theological
interpretation), textualist and originalist interpretations are much more fruitful.
They contribute to legal certainty and exclude judicial arbitrariness. So whereas
the idea ofa 'Living Constitution' in law leads to the undermining ofcentral moral
and political values, the idea of 'Living Religious Scripture' is inescapable if we
want to avoid the consequences of religious zealotism.
4 See on interpreting the Bible and the Constitution Pelikan 2004, Grey 1984: 1-25.
5 'the rightto free exercise ofreligion implies the rightto free exercise ofnon-religion'
Sullivan 1992: 197. See also Hegener 2005. For a critique see Sapir et al. 2005.
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The structure ofthe argument is as follows. First I will dwell on the problematic
passages in religious scripture on freedom of religion (or rather the absence of
freedom of religion). Subsequently I will show that in the Bible itself we find the
archetype ofthe religious terrorist in the figure ofPhinehas who on God's command
slays two religious dissenters who disobey the divine will. After this I will illustrate
that the religious believer has three choices if scripture seems to require violence:
(a) do what seems required as Phinehas did, (b) rejection of scripture as something
that has authority over us as Thomas Paine did, (c) 'interpreting' the text in such a
way that the moral problem vanishes as advocated by Kant.
This systematic part is followed by an analysis of the way Immanuel Kant
developed the 'third way' out of the dilemma. Kant reconciled moral autonomy
with the religious tradition and scriptural authority. Via the hermeneutics of
ScWeiermacher and others this kind of 'liberal interpretation' gained the upper
hand in the theory oflegal interpretation as advocated by legal scholars as William
Brennan and Ronald Dworkin. But, so my argument goes, what seems inevitable
in the field of theological interpretation because we carmot change scripture
openly is less convincing in the legal field as is made clear by Antonin Scalia
and Robert Bork. A legal Constitution is not the same as Religious Scripture. A
Constitution can be amended by the royal way (changing the text on the initiative
of the legislature) whereas religious interpreters are forced to use 'interpretation'
to change their Holy Scripture.
'A Warning Against Idolatry'
A good place to start our argument is with Deuteronomy 13: 1-3 ('a warning
against idolatry', as the English Standard Version euphemistically puts it). There
we find the following passage:
If a prophet or a dreamer of dreams arises among you and gives you a sign or a
wonder, and the sign or wonder that he tells you comes to pass, and if he says,
'let us go after other gods', which you have not known, 'and let us serve them',
you shall not listen to the words of that prophet or that dreamer of dreams.
The warning exemplified in this passage carmot come as a shock to a well-
informed reader. Every faith will discourage its devotees to go after other gods.'
Every religion tries to keep its flock together and so does the Jewish religion. The
Bible says: 'You shall walk after the Lord your God and fear him and keep his
commandments and obey his voice, and you shall serve him and hold fast to him'
(Deut. 13: 4-5).
6 Usually backed by legal threats. See on this Levy 1993. See on religious liberty
Ruffini et al. 1912.
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The theory of ethics that is implicit in this passage is what has been called the
'divine command theory' of ethics (Idziak 1979: 1-38). The believer is supposed
to follow the ethical injunctions that are revealed by God, manifested in Scripture
('keep his commandments'). There is a problem though. Doing this can imply
tensions with what we consider morally appropriate or what is legally required or
prohibited by civil law or 'human law' (as contrasted with 'divine law').
So far Deuteronomy has suggested nothing that can be considered problematic
in the sense of violating the moral or civil law, but in Deuteronomy 13:5 there is
a turn. After the turn, we read: 'But that prophet or that dreamer of dreams shall
be put to death, because he has taught rebellion against the Lord your God, who
brought you out ofthe land ofEgypt and redeemed you out of the house ofslavery,
to make you leave the way in which the Lord your God commanded you to walk.
So you shall purge the evil from your midst' (Deuteronomy 13: 5-6).
So the prophet or the dreamer ofdreams 'shall be put to death'.
If this is interpreted as a description of what will happen after death, this text
may still be compatible with contemporary civil and penal law for these are only
applicable to the situation here on earth. It is not very polite perhaps to tell other
people that they will burn in hell for what they believe or not believe, but as long
as the furnace is not ignited in this life these visions about what happens in the
hereafter are everybody's own concern. It appears from the context, however, that
the Bible is not simply making a factual statement about what will happen to our
souls in future life, but admonishes the believers in this world to execute the false
prophet or the 'dreamer of dreams' among the living. That means: the individual
believer is exhorted - in contemporary jargon - to 'take the law in its own hands'
and purge the community from false prophets.
That the Bible takes this point seriously appears from further commentary on
the way this prescript should be interpreted. There it appears that this injunction is
not restricted to unknown people but should also be applied to those most intimate
and dear to us. Our brother, our son, daughter, wife or friend - they should all be
put to death if they preach rebellion against the Lord. In Deuteronomy 13:6-12
we read:
Ifyour brother, the son ofyour mother, or your son or your daughter or the wife
you embrace or your friend who is as your own soul entices you secretly, saying,
'let us go and serve other gods', which neither you nor your fathers have known,
some of the gods or the peoples who are around you, whether near you or far off
from you, from one end of the earth to the other, you shall not yield to him or
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~,~~~
conceal him. But you shall kill him. Your hand shall be first against him to put
him to death, and afterwards the hand of all the people.
You shall stone him to death with stones, because he sought to draw you away
from the Lord your God, who brought you out of the land of Egypt, out of the
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house of slavery. And all Israel shall hear and fear and never again do any such
wickedness as this among you.
'Warnillg against idolatry' is an unduly euphemistic qualification of what we find
here, so it appears. It is a warnillg to idolaters, false prophets, dreamers ofdreams,
but the text also spells out in no uncertain terms what has to be done with them.
They deserve the death penalty. And the execution of this death penalty is not
reserved to God in the hereafter, but the text proclaims it to be the specific duty of
all members ofthe Jewish tribe to execute this punishment.
Furthermore, we should not be distracted from our religious duties when the
false prophet is our son, our daughter, brother or wife. Especially when it comes to
those dear to us: we should be the first to throw the stone, the rest of the community
has to follow.
In modem terminology we should qualify this as a prohibition of apostasy.'
When we compare this provision in the Bible with modem constitutions and modem
text-books of penal law there is a manifest contradiction. Modem constitutions
and treaties on human rights proclaim the freedom of religion. That freedom also
comprises the freedom to reject one specific religion or relinquish all religions.
So here we have a manifest contradiction ofmodem constitutional 'Scripture' and
'holy Scripture' as handed down by the ancient religions of the book.
That contradiction is not restricted to the matter of apostasy. The text in
Deuteronomy also has a completely different view on taking the law in your own
hands from the modem state. Deuteronomy presents no guiding rules for how
worldly government has to deal with the matter of apostasy; it does not even refer
to God. It is the individual member of the community that is assigned as law
officer and executioner. We all have to stone the apostates ourselves and those
inciting others to embrace the false gods.
It requires no elaborate argument that this would be detrimental to civil order.
And this would not only be detrimental to the modern civil order, by the way,
but it would also undermine ancient states and communities. No state, whether
ancient or modern, can condone violence perpetrated by citizens themselves. A
clear example of what this would imply we find in the biblical story of Phinehas.
The Story of Phinehas: A Biblical 'Religious Terrorist'
The story ofPhinehas is told in the book Numbers. Numbers 25 is dedicated to Baal
Worship at Peor. While Israel lived in Shittim, the people ofIsrael began 'to whore
with the daughters of Moab', the Bible informs us. These invited the Israelites
7 In several European countries there is a debate about apostasy in Islam. See on this
Zwemer 1924 who answers the question why there are so few Moslem converts, and who
gives examples of their moral courage and martyrdom, Warraq 2003, Jami 2007, Ahadi
2008.
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to the sacrifices of their gods and those 'daughters of Moab' had apparently
considerable success with their invitations because the Israelites 'bowed down
to their gods' (Numbers 25: 2). The Bible spells out what this means: 'So Israel
yoked himself to Baal of Peor'.
This made the Lord angry. He directed himselfto Moses and said: 'Take all the
chiefs of the people and hang them in the sun before the Lord, that the fierce anger
of the Lord may turn away from Israel.'
Moses took action and said to the judges ofIsrael: 'Each of you kill those of
the men who have yoked themselves to Baal of Peor.'
It is not so clear whether the last command of Moses is identical to what the
Lord commanded. The Lord seemed to exact the killing and punishment of all
the chiefs. Moses though seems to build in a proviso: he ordered killing only
those who had actually yielded to the temptation of the daughters of Moab. So
for Moses a precondition for punishment was personal guilt (mens rea).' From
a modem perspective this seems almost self-evident, but not everybody in the
community was satisfied with the way Moses handled the matter. There was a
certain Phinehas who defied the authority of Moses and took the law in its own
hands. The immediate occasion for this was the following.
Phinehas saw how one of the men of Israel brought a Midianite woman to his
tent (Numbers 25: 6). When Phinehas saw this, he rose and left the congregation
and took a spear. He 'went after the man ofIsrael into the chamber and pierced both
of them, the man ofIsrael and the woman through her belly' (Numbers 25: 8).
So far, we only have an exciting although gruesome story. What makes the story
interesting, however, is the reaction ofthe Lord. What did God say about Phinehas'
slaying ofthe people who, according to modem standards, were perfectly justified
to pray to the gods of their own choosing (protected by the freedom of religion,
after all)? The Lord sided with Phinehas and the authority of Moses was clearly
defied on the basis of the subsequent events. The Lord said to Moses: 'Phinehas
the son of Eleazar, son of Aaron the priest, has turned back my wrath from the
people of Israel' (Numbers 25: 10). Phinehas was even rewarded for the public
execution without trial of the man and the woman. The Lord said: 'Behold, I give
to him my covenant of peace, and it shall be to him and to his descendants after
him the covenant of a perpetual priesthood, because he was jealous for his God
and made atonement for the people ofIsrael' (Numbers 25: 13).
So those who flout the legitimate authority of the temporal leaders of the
people (Moses) are rewarded by God. Apparently, the religious zeal of Phinehas
is appreciated more by God than the cautious way of dealing with the matter by
Moses. This stance can have (and is likely to have) grave consequences. This can be
seen as substantial encouragement to those who claim special knowledge of God's
will and are prepared to perpetrate violence in defiance of the traditional political
leaders of the state. Phinehas can be seen as the archetypical religious terrorist
(Selengut 2003, Griffith 2002, Juergensmeyer 2003). Phinehas is prepared, on
8 See on criminal intent Slapper et al. 2004: 206.
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religious considerations ('I know what God wants') to use violence against citizens
ofthe state, thereby violating the law ofthe state and defYing legitimate authority.
That is the essence of the religious terrorist. When Yigal Amir killed Yitzak Rabin
in 1995 on religious considerations or when contemporary Islamist terrorists kill
people because their victims are considered to be guilty of 'blasphemy' (cf. the
Danish cartoonists or the Dutch writer Theo van Gogh) this is all according to the
same pattern. The religious terrorist wants to punish the blasphemer and instil fear
into the hearts of the citizenry.
What makes the story interesting and disconcerting at the same time, is that
the ruthless behaviour of Phinehas is more appreciated by the Lord than the way
Moses had handled the matter. After all, Phinehas brought the people of Israel
back on the right track, the Bible tells us. The people ofIsrael are expected to serve
one God and one God only: the Lord. In the Ten Commandments this is put thus:
'You shall have no gods before me' (Exodus 20:3).
It is clear that this attitude and the whole worldview connected with it is hard
to reconcile with modem freedom of religion, freedom of worship, freedom of
speech, freedom ofconscience, free inquiry and other fundamental rights ingrained
in the concept of liberal democracy.' It is of course possible to acknowledge the
prohibition to venerate strange gods as a private religious command, but the state
cannot act upon this political morality without violating modem human rights.
What Options are Open to the Believer?
Now let us see what these stories about freedom of religion imply for the idea of
theological interpretation. Passages like those quoted before present believers with
a vexing dilemma. How do they have to interpret those seemingly authoritative
commands from God if they contradict common sense or the principles of shared
morality? How can they reconcile the idea ofa Holy Text with modem civil order?
Here we have to return to the legal domain because the individual believer is in
a similar position as the judges were in the case of Elmer as mentioned at the
beginning of this article.
My comparison between the believer and the judge requires some clarification
though. Presupposed to this analogy is the presumption that both the Bible and a
legal text claim a certain moral, political or legal authority. With a legal text that is
more or less self-evident. Suppose a judge would tell us that he considers the law
and also the Constitution to be some kind of poetry. It is inspiring to read, but the
text has no bearing on the legal decisions that he makes, the judge tells us. That
judge would be declared mad and evicted from his office.
Now, let us shift our attention from the judge to the ordinary believer and to
the theologian. Suppose the believer tells us that the story of Phinehas is a source
of interesting reflections but it has no influence on his attitude towards apostates,
9 See for a conceptual analysis Holden 1993.
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heretics and unbelievers. Would that believer be declared mad, as would be the
case with the judge? Probably not. Actually, in a time ofreligious fundamentalism
and even religious terrorism this believer is likely to be praised for his liberalism
and broadmindedness.
Nevertheless, we have to discern between praising somebody because of his
ethical behaviour or his moral attitude and praising him for the soundness of his
theology. It is perfectly possible that the liberal believer is a bad theologian.
But what would make a good theologian? And what is the relation between a
theologian and a believer? One thing is sure: not every theologian is a believer. But
can a believer also refrain from being a theologian altogether? With regard to the
three theistic religions the answer is 'no'. This has to do with the specific nature
of the god that the three theistic faiths subscribe to. They subscribe to a belief in
the existence of a personal god with specific characteristics (almighty, perfectly
good, eternal, creator of heaven and earth).lO That personal god is not some
Epicurian god that does not meddle with human affairs but He has expectations
from his community of believers in this world as is made abundantly clear from
the Bible and the Qur'an. The believers are required not only to acquire theoretical
knowledge about God (the job of a theologian), but also act upon that knowledge
(behaving according to His precepts).
So the good theologian tries to construe a concept of God and the sincere
believer tries to make up what God expects of him.
Let us dwell a little longer on the job of the theologian. I said: being a sincere
believer presupposes being a theologian as well (at least as good as you can). But
what about the situation of the theologian? Must he be a believer? I said 'no'.
To illustrate my point let me make a small excursion. W.B. Drees in this volume
comments on the title ofone ofmy books: Godhoudt nietvan vrijzinnigheid(2004).
Translated in English that would be: 'God does not favour a liberal attitude' or
(more freely) 'God is no supporter ofliberal theology'. A variant would be: 'God
doesn't like freethinkers.' Drees, knowing I am not a believer, is puzzled by that
title and wonders how I can claim to have knowledge about God. How do I know
that God is no supporter of freethought?
Drees offers two options to inquire into the matter. The first option is that
I derive my knowledge about God's characteristics from God Himself (special
revelation; think about Abraham, Phinehas, Moses). But in my case that is
unlikely. Unbelievers do not hear the voice of God. Precisely that is the reason
for their unbelief. The second option is that I have studied the behaviour and the
convictions of 'real believers'. If so, then it is from the real believers that I derive
my knowledge about God. But then a second problem arises: how do I know who
is the 'real believer'? If! pick out the conservative believers the title of my book
seems justified, but selecting the liberals would point in another direction. So the
title of my book is a misnomer, Drees concludes. Q.E.D.
10 See several contributions on 'the divine attributes' in Peterson et al. 1996: 97-145.
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Is it? Or is this too hastily? I think it is. Why not consider a third option?
Tertium non datur? Of course there is. Precisely that third way makes it possible
for scholars of different persuasions at the faculties of theology, religious studies,
cultural anthropology or ancient history to study the Greek gods or the Hindu
gods. Every non-Greek scholar can read the Odyssey or the Iliad and learn about
the characteristics of the Greek gods. He does not need special revelations from
Apollo or personal communication with Poseidon. And if this is the way we
acquire knowledge about the Greek gods, why should not the atheist or unbeliever,
living in the twenty-first century, proceed in exactly the same way with regard to
the Christian god? Unbelievers can read the Bible, can't they?
The same applies to the Qur'an and Islam. How can Theo van Gogh (of all
people) know that 'Allah weet het beter' ('Allah knows best')? (2003) and is
Chahdortt Djavann qualified to answer the question 'Que pense Allah d'Europe'?
(2004). Another testimony is to be found with Nahed Selim. She pretends to know
something about the predilections ofAllah as well: 'Allah houdt met van vrouwen'
('Allah does not like women') (2007). How does she know? Judged by the criteria
of Drees these are all unjustified pretensions. But are they really? With regard to
Allah Van Gogh, Djavann and Selim can do the same as I do with regard to God:
reading scripture. It is from Scripture that we can get an idea of the qualities of
God. Unbelievers do not have to believe in the real existence ofthis God (as Drees
seems to presume) in order to ascertain certain of His qualities.
The next question is, of course, whether we can, by reading the Bible or
Qur'an, get a general idea of the characteristics of God. Does it not all depend on
what passages we refer to (the same problem Drees had referred to with individual
believers now pops up with biblical passages)? Certainly, we have the story
about Adam and Eve, being punished for their disobedience. We have the story
of Phinehas who was more eager to obey God than pay reference to the authority
of Moses and was being praised for that. We have the test of Abraham, the test
of Job. These all point in the direction of the title of my book: 'God does not like
insubordination'. But there is also the Sermon on the Mount and stories that point
in a different direction, my critics can contend. How to choose what stories give
the right picture of God? Isn't it all in the eye ofthe beholder?
The postmodern reading of texts will answer 'yes'.!! We cannot get something
out ofthe text that we did not project into it beforehand. Personally, I do not favour
that position. In all texts, whether they are legal, literary or religious, there is an
element of vagueness, ambiguity and open texture, but that does not mean that
'anything goes' (Bix 1993). This would result in what has been called 'cherry
picking theology' or - with reference to Christianity - 'cafeteria Christianity'
(D'Souza 2007: xii). The theological debate about the Bible should be about whose
conception of God is more in accordance with the text of the Bible. If that sounds
too 'Protestant' one may add that also the interpretation of Holy Scripture by the
11 Excellent analysis and criticism of postmodemism is to be found in Searle 1993
and Gellner 1992.
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Church should be taken into account. But whatever additional sources one may
advance, that does not alter the fact that there is something to be interpreted and
that interpretation is something different from simply stating your own opinions.
It may be argued, ofcourse, that the Bible is not one book but a series ofbooks.
The god of the book Job is not the same god as the god of the book Matthew.
In that case Christians, Jews and perhaps also Muslims are not monotheists but
polytheists, although the majority of them do not openly acknowledge this (Miles
1995). Anyhow, I will follow the traditionalist pretension that it is possible to make
generalizing comments on the image ofGod as it appears through all the books of
the Bible. And comparing and analysing a representative selection ofthose stories,
so I claim as a non-believing amateur-theologian, gives us the picture of God as
someone who is against freethinkers, not in favour ofthem.12
Nevertheless, I have to emphasize that my argument in this chapter is not
dependent on this generalization about the nature of God. I was challenged by
Drees to articulate something about my worldview (and defend the legitimacy of
'god-talk' by unbelievers),13 but this worldview is in itself irrelevant for the point
that I hope to make in this article. Here I want to reflect on some notorious hard
cases in Scripture and therefore I need only the stories that I have presented here
to make my point. Even if these passages are a minority and even if the amount of
believers that 'takes them seriously' is small, their presence is real and they present
real problems.
We have to take up a second question though. In what I have written before,
I inquired whether the biblical text has any authority over us. Is the Bible for
the serious believer more like a poem or more like a penal code? As Wim Drees
makes clear in his contribution to this book: that cjepends on what part of the Bible
we refer to. Some Psalms have primarily a poetical quality. But that does not
exclude that the Bible also has parts that resemble a penal code or that offer ethical
exhortation. The Ten Commandments, e.g., are not meant to be read as a poem.
And if Jesus admonishes us 'You shall love your neighbour as yourself' (Matthew
22:39) it would be silly to say that this should not be taken seriously or that it was
not meant as ethical exhortation. In passages such as Matthew 22:39 the Bible
presents itself as moral guidance.
Now the question is: are the stories ofpeople praying to strange gods who have
to be killed more like poems or more like the penal code? If we interpret them
as poems the problems that I dwell upon do not arise, of course. But that is not
the way I read them and it is not the way I think they should be construed. Those
stories, so I contend, tell us something about the obedience that God demands
12 Human autonomy is in many stories of the Bible presented as a manifestation of
sin: 'man's rebellion against God, his effort to usurp the place of God'. See Niebuhr 1964:
179.
13 Even an 'agnostic' can claim to say something about the idea ofGod as manifested
in Scripture. This is also what the great agnostics, Huxley and Clifford, have actually done.
See Huxley 1992: 193-232; Madigan 1999: ix-xii; Pyle 1995: ix-xxvi.
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from his believers.'4 In those stories there is implicitly a theory of meta-ethics.
That theory is: God knows best. Or: the best justification for a moral stance is that
it is in accordance with divine will as manifested in special revelation or because
it is in accordance with Holy Scripture.
To sum up: the ordinary believer is expected to do what God requires from
him in Scripture. To understand what is required every ordinary believer has, apart
from being a believer, to be an amateur-theologian as well, and inquire what the
content of the will of God is. At least, this is the case in the Protestant tradition.
Catholics have an interpretative aristocracy who do the job of interpreting Holy
Scripture for the believers.
Having clarified my position about some possible misunderstandings I can
now take up the line of my discourse. The question is: what do we have to do
if following the prescriptions in the authoritative source conflict with common
morality? Do we have to say with Judge Gray in the case Riggs v. Pahner lex dura,
sed lex? Or should we, as Judge Earl defended, contend that immoral outcomes
simply cannot be the wish ofthe legislator? Or is this either/or-dilemma false and
are the seemingly different positions reconcilable?
There are three positions we have to distinguish in answering this question.
Do What is Required
The first option open to the believer is simply doing what seems to be required
by God. God is perfectly good, ahnighty, in short: all perfections are united in
his personality. So what could be a more reliable guide in the field of morals than
divine will and wisdom? Isn't following the divine injunctions the most reliable
guide in this complex world?
If we follow this course, the next step is figuring out what God tells us about
moral dilemmas. How do we know the will of God? According to agnostics the
will of God is inscrutable.
The term 'agnosticism' was coined by T.R. Huxley (1825-1895) in 1869. He
used it to denote his own view on knowledge of the transcendent dimension of
reality. 'Agnosticism is not a creed but a method', Huxley said. And the essence
ofthis method he typified as: 'the vigorous application of a single principle.' This
principle had two dimensions, one positive, one negative. 'Positively', so Huxley
contends, 'the principle may be expressed in matters of intellect, follow your
reason as far as it can take you without other considerations' . And negatively: 'do
not pretend conclusions are certain that are not demonstrated or demonstrable.'15
Twenty years later Huxley wrote again on agnosticism in Agnosticism and
christianity (1889). Here he contended: 'That it is wrong for a man to say he
14 This reading is in conformity with Dershowitz 2000.
15 Both essays are to be found in Huxley 1992. See for commentaries on agnosticism
Pyle 1995. Excerpts from Huxley are also comprised in Stein 1980. See further comment
in Stein 1985: 3-4.
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is certain of the objective truth of a proposition unless he can produce evidence
which logically justifies that certainty. This is what agnosticism asserts and, in my
opinion, is all that is essential to agnosticism.'
Unfortunately for Huxley, this is not the definition of agnosticism that would
become current meaning. Nowadays agnosticism almost denotes the complete
opposite of what Huxley wanted it to mean. For Huxley agnosticism meant:
not professing to have knowledge about things that you cannot have knowledge
of.!6 Nowadays agnosticism is delineated as 'leaving open' the question whether
God exists or not. The agnostic is the one who can have a flirt with God and the
transcendental although he knows that his positive knowledge does not warrant
this. For some, agnosticism is a moderate and more modest form of theism. The
mainstream of the believers, though, subscribe to the position that the will of God
can be known because God has revealed his will to us. And some great religious
leaders were directly visited by God, such as Moses, Abraham, Mohammed,
Phinehas and Jesus Christ, but for the majority ofthe believers it seems a grotesque
pretension to claim to know the will of God. They have to rely on what has been
revealed to them by the religious leaders or by Holy Scripture.
The paradigm case of a revelation to a religious leader is Moses, receiving the
Ten Commandments on the Mount Sinai. The bulk ofthe believers though are not
directly addressed. They have to listen to what has been revealed to people like
Moses. Only some audacious figures do not comply. I have presented Phinehas as
an example. Phinehas is one of those rare examples of people who got away with
interpretations of divine revelation that differ from the interpretations of official
religious leaders (in his case Moses). Most of those non-official interpreters were
burned at the stake, as Giordano Bruno was at the Campo dei Fiori in Rome in
1600, or otherwise punished on account of heresy or blasphemy.!7
At first sight an orientation on the direct will of God seems a reliable guide to
follow. But that is only appearance. In reality direct revelations confront us with
all kind of problems. Those problems can best be illustrated when God seems
to require something that we utterly abhor. Also the direct revelations have their
'hard cases'. The most famous of these is the sacrifice ofAbraham.
In Genesis 22:1 the Bible tells us that God 'tested Abraham'. God said to
Abraham: 'Take your son, your only son Isaac, whom you love and go to the
land of Moraiah, and offer him there as a burnt offering on one of the mountains
of which I shall tell you.' And Abraham was prepared to do that (see the story in
Genesis 22:1~13).
Because of this obedience Abraham is praised by the Lord. The angel of the
Lord said to Abraham: 'By myself I have sworn, declares the Lord, because you
have done this and have not withheld your son, your only son, I will surely bless
you, and I will surely multiply your offspring as the stars ofheaven and as the sand
16 In a similar way Clifford 1999: 70-96 and Stephen 1898 (republished 1969).
17 See for examples in Great-Britain Bradlaugh Bonner 1934. On the concept of
heresy Evans 2003.
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that is on the seashore. And your offspring shall possess the gate of his enemies
and in your offspring shall all the nations ofthe earth be blessed, because you have
obeyed my voice' (Genesis 22: 15-18).
So obeying the Lord gets heavy emphasis in this passage.
As I stated before, the theory of ethics or more precisely of 'meta-ethics' that
is implicit in these passages is called the 'divine command theory' of ethics. The
Divine Command Theory considers the moral 'good' as identical with 'willed by
God'. 'Morally right' means'ordained by God'. 'Morally wrong' means 'forbidden
by God.'18 There is no independent or 'autonomous' ethical good, but morals is
ultimately founded in the will ofGod.
Divine command ethics is by some ethicists characterised as 'supernaturalism'.
Supernaturalism teaches that moral judgments give us a description of the will of
God, so the ethicist and logician Harry Gensler writes. To call something 'good'
means that it is in accordance with the will of God. Ethics is based on religion
(1998: 33-46, 34).
A contemporary adherent of divine command ethics is Ianine Marie Idziak.
He formulates the core of the theory as follows: 'Generally speaking, a 'divine
command moralist' is one who maintains that the content of morality (i.e., what
is right and wrong, good and evil, just and unjust, and the like) is directly and
solely dependent upon the commands and prohibitions of God' (1979: 1-38, 1).
Another ethicist who ana1yzed the central characteristics of divine command
morality (although a fierce opponent of the theory)19 is James Rachels (1941-
2003). He writes that according to divine command moralists God is seen as a
legislative institution that issues laws that we, humans, have to obey (2003: 48-
63, 50). Sometimes God 'tests' whether humans are prepared to bring the highest
offer. The story ofAbraham is a case in point. We could, however also point out
other examples: the story of Job, for instance. In the story of Job God brings so
many inflictions on Job that he could think that they were coming from the devil.
But it was a test. The theologian Jack Miles writes about God: '[... ] he tempts him
(Job, PC) by speaking to him in the tones of merciless power. Job passes the test
precisely as Abraham did' (1995: 322).
Adherents to divine command ethics we do not only find among biblical and
Qur'anic religious figures (Moses, Abraham, Phinehas, Mohammed), but also
among the great philosophers. Idziak presents an impressive list of adherents
among the great philosophers of the western tradition: John Duns Scotus, William
of Ockham, Pierre d'Ailly, Jean Gerson, Martin Luther, John Calvin, Karl Barth,
Emil Brunner and many others (Idziak 1979: vii-ix). Divine command ethics is an
important current in philosophical meta-ethics.
18 Blackbum 1996: 115-33. 'Ainsi, ce qui est bien, c'est que la divinite recommande ;
ce qui est mal, c'est ce qu la divinite interdit' (1996: 116).
19 See in particular Rachels 1971: 325-37, also in Rachels 1997: 109-25.
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But although the intellectual credentials of the theory are hard to contest, the
practical consequences of adopting it seem dubious. Accepting the direct voice of
God (Mohammed, Jesus, Moses, Phinehas) or his text (Fernandez-Armesto 2003:
106--7) (the majority of the believers) as the ultimate foundation of ethics could
lead to self-sacrifice and martyrdom (Davis 2003). And what is worse: it could lead
to the sacrifice of others, as the story ofAbraham and Isaac spells out. In an age
of international terrorism this poses considerable problems for the maintenance of
the political order (Esposito 2002, Selengut 2003).
Those problems stimulated several commentators and scholars to look for
alternatives to divine command morality. Following the will ofGod, whatever that
may lead to, may make us true believers and earn the praise ofGod, but it does not
make us good citizens. It may even make us religious terrorists, as Phinehas was,
trying to deter the people ofIsrael from worshipping the wrong gods. So we may
be happy that great thinkers have always inquired whether there are alternatives
for divine command morality.
Rejection ofthe Text as Authoritative
That brings us to the second option that is open to someone who is confronted with
a hard case in Scripture. He can also choose to reject the text as something that
has authority over us. According to the second position we have to follow our own
moral considerations, independent on the divine will. According to adherents of
the divine command ethics this second option is identical with 'relativism'. Divine
command moralists acknowledge only one strategy to evade moral relativism: the
foundation of ethics in the divine will. But there may be many other ways to
safe ethics from relativism. In fact the philosophic tradition is full of alternatives,
Platonism being one of the most well known.
What characterizes the second option is not its relativist bent, but the fact that
ethics is not founded in the will of God. Whereas the first option subscribes to the
position of 'moral heteronomy' (ethics dependent on religion), the second option
subscribes to 'moral autonomy' (ethics as an autonomous discipline).
With regard to texts as have been quoted from Genesis (Abraham) and
Deuteronomy (the slaying of the apostates) or Numbers (Phinehas murdering the
worshippers of the wrong gods) the reaction ofmodern (or 'liberal' or 'moderate')
believers is sometimes that those texts do not have authority over us because
the New Testament has mitigated the rigid rules of the Old Testament. The Old
Testament, so the argument goes, comprises injunctions for the Jewish people, not
for the rest of humanity living under completely different conditions. The New
Testament though comprises moral commands that are still valid for us today.
Is that a viable way out of the dilemma?
We may doubt this. Let us underpin this doubt by some exegesis of a well
known passage in the New Testament. In John 15:6 Jesus Christ proclaims: 'If
anyone does not abide in me he is thrown away like a branch and withers, and
the branches are gathered, thrown into the fire, and burned.' This text is further
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elaborated in 2 Thessalonians I :5-9 where under the heading 'The Judgement at
Christ's Coming' we read:
This is evidence ofthe righteous judgement of God, that you may be considered
worthy of the kingdom of God, for which you are also suffering - since indeed
God considers it just to repay with affliction those who afflict you, and to grant
relief to you who are afflicted as wen as to us, when the Lord Jesus is revealed
from heaven with his mighty angels in flaming fire, inflicting vengeance on
those who do not know God and on those who do not obey the gospel of our
Lord Jesus. They will suffer the punishment of eternal destruction, away from
the presence ofthe Lord [... ].
According to these passages the difference between the Old Testament and the
New Testament is not that great. Unbeliefand apostasy are heavily punished. What
is lacking in the New Testament, however, are incitements to kill the unbelievers
by our own hands. The right to punish the unbelievers seems to be reserved to God
or to Jesus. There is no mention of a Phinehas who with divine approval takes the
law into his own hands. That is a great comfort to the unbelievers and apostates,
of course, because now they do not have to fear for their lives if they change or
relinquish their religion. There is no encouragement ofreligious terrorism.
But for all the differences: there are similarities as well. Neither the Old
Testament, nor the New Testament seems to proclaim the 'free exercise ofreligion'
(as the first amendment to the American Constitution proclaims) as a fundamental
human right. The New Testament is an improvement on the Old, but it does not take
the position of modem declarations ofhuman rights, that is: proclaiming freedom
of conscience, freedom of religion, including the freedom to change religion or
even rejecting religion at all. Both the Old and the New Testament would imply
problems for contemporary societies ifthe moral injunctions would be taken as the
source of inspiration for the modem civil order.20
Would that mean that only a complete rejection of the authority of the text
could rescue the believer out of this dilemma? And is that possible within the
confines of a religious position? Is it possible to remain and a believing Christian,
Muslim, Jew and proclaim the text of the Bible and the Qur'an is no more than a
'source of inspiration', not a 'holy text'?
It is only very liberal believers that subscribe to that position. And they are
hardly to be distinguished from unbelievers. They call themselves 'Christians',
'Jews', 'Muslims', they call their book a 'holy book' perhaps, but it is 'holy' only
in a very watered down meaning. It is only a 'source ofinspiration' . Most believers
feel uncomfortable with such a very liberal position and shy away from this. They
want to remain faithful to a 'real' holy textthat has authority over us and atthe same
time avoid the nasty consequences that people like Abraham and Phinehas were
so eager to draw. So they looked for an alternative route, hoping to sail between
20 As the so-caned 'Biblische Weisung' advocates. See Wolbert 2005.
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the Scylla of blind obedience to revealed truths and the Charybdis of denuding
the text of supernatural significance. That third route is called 'interpretation' of
a 'living text'.
'Interpreting'the Text
The third way to deal with problematic texts seems to make it possible to have
your cake and eat it. That is: on the one hand we stick to the idea of the authority
of the text, based on the supreme importance of its author; on the other we can
by means of 'interpretation' modifY and adapt the text in such a way that makes it
palatable for modem moral conscience.
In this approach the text is presented as a 'living document'. The text has
different messages to different people in different times. The text changes its
content in historical perspective. Moral injunctions that literally interpreted would
result in draconic measures are 'interpreted' in such a way that cruel and crude
behaviour can be evaded.
The advantages of this strategy are clear. We combine the advantages of the
first and the second interpretation strategy. We can remain faithful to the idea of
the authoritative text, as the religious tradition seems to require (a clear advantage
of the first strategy), but we can also reject immoral behaviour (as is the advantage
of the second way in dealing with problematic passages). By means of the 'living
text' we can have our cake and eat it. We do not have to be fundamentalists or even
terrorists (as the first strategy could imply), nor atheists (as the second strategy
seems to result in).
How does the third strategy in dealing with problematic texts function? To
understand this we can perhaps best return to the story ofAbraham and Isaac.
Over the centuries countless moral philosophers have noticed that this story
and the morality that it conveys present great difficulties for a decent civil order
and sound moral sense. One of the philosophers that wrestled with the story of
Abraham is the great German thinker Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). Before
entering into the question how Kant interprets the dilemma ofAbraham it may be
illuminating to say something about his religious position in general.
The Founding Father of Modernism: Immanuel Kant
Kant tried to reconcile the spiritual heritage of two great influences on his
philosophy. On the one hand he was influenced by the scepticism ofDavid Hume,
on the other by the work of J.J. Rousseau. The work of Hume pointed in the
direction of extreme scepticism towards religious thinking if not to outright
atheism (something Hume was at pains to deny, as we all understand if we realize
the draconic consequences this would have, if confessed openly). The work of
Rousseau led to a new role for God in life, based on mainly moral considerations
(Beck 1997: 63-83, 63).
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The sceptical or secular strain in his work manifests itselfin Kant's contribution
to science. He developed what has come to be known as the 'Kant-Laplace
hypothesis'. This is the astronomical theory that explains the origin of the solar
system out of a primordial nebula, making use only of physical laws and without
calling upon the intervention of God in nature.
Writing God out of science was not without danger though and Kant was read
critically by the authorities of his day. Kant-scholar Lewis White Beck writes
(1997: 65):
Perhaps the only real excitement in his otherwise quiet life was provided by the
royal prohibition on his teaching and writing on the subject ofreligion. This ban
of censorship was applied soon after his chief work on religion was published,
though he had been having trouble with the censor during its publication and had
had to employ somewhat tricky procedures to have it published.
Kant's response to the ban was: 'As your Majesty's humble servant, I agree not to
publish or teach on religious subjects'. Kant was writing under Frederick William
IT (1744-1797), King ofPrussia from 1786 till 1797. But when the king died, Kant
again felt free to publish his thoughts on religion, because he felt bound to the king
himself, not to his successors. So in the later editions ofReligion within the Limits
ofReason alone Kant felt more free.
In his previous work, mainly the Critique ofPure Reason, Kant had held that
the theoretical proofs of the existence of God are fallacious. Nevertheless he did
not say that God did not exist. He denied only that we could know it. In a famous
sentence he declared: 'I have found it necessary to deny knowledge, in order to
make room for faith' (quoted in Beck 1997: 71). In the work of Kant faith is
contrasted with knowledge, not with reason. It is possible to entertain a reasonable
form of faith. What Kant binds to Hume is that both writers undermined the
rational theology that was popular in their time, but with Kant there is not a trace
of irony in his religious philosophy as is the case with Hume. Kant takes religion
seriously, as did Rousseau.
The question is: how could Kant found his rational faith if not on knowledge?
The answer is: it was based on morality. Initially, Kant seemed to reject all traces
of religion in the edifice of his thought. He rejects the divine command theory
of ethics. Kant said that we respect the moral law because it is a law which we,
as reasonable beings, legislate for ourselves. So in that sense morality is not
dependent on religion. Nevertheless, religion that was in a way thrown out of the
window by Kant on account of his theoretical philosophy, is smuggled in through
the backdoor of his practical philosophy. Kant was impressed by the fact that the
most virtuous people are not always the happiest. And he thought that in a rational
world our moral values and expectations could not always be out of concord with
how the world is like. There should be some proportioning of desert and reward in
the world. If this proportioning could not take place in this world, then it should
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be the case in the world after this: in the hereafter. According to Kant God is a
postulate.
Let us now see how Kant struggles with the questions we have addressed in
this article. How is his rational faith reconciled with the hard cases in Scripture
that we have presented? How can Kant harmonize moral autonomy with an eternal
legislator for this world? To answer these questions we have to go back to the
story of Abraham and Isaac. And indeed, Kant contrasts his own ideas with the
Divine Command Theory as manifested in the story ofAbraham and Isaac. In Die
Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft (1793) or Religion within
the Limits ofReason Alone, (1981b: 649-879) the book that brought him under
the censure of the Prussian government for having 'misused his philosophy to the
detriment of disparagement of many fundamental tenets of Holy Scripture and
Christianity' (Beck 1997: 77), Kant starts with the presupposition that nobody is
free to take anybody else's life on the basis ofreligious convictions.2! If God seems
to have issued such a horrific command as we encounter in the story ofAbraham,
we should be skeptical about the content.
Kant was a very cautious thinker who tried his best not to give offence to the
authorities and the clergy of his time. Nevertheless, implicitly his comment on
the story ofAbraham implies a radical critique of the concept of revelation, as the
censor was not slow to figure out.
lt is illuminating to compare the cautious way of dealing with this topic by
Kant with the more straightforward and heretical position ofthe British freethinker
Thomas Paine (1737-1809), who was Kant's contemporary. In his controversial
book The Age of Reason (1794), published one year after Kant's Die Religion
innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft, Paine comments on Moses receiving
the Ten Commandments from above. This was a 'revelation', so Paine tells us,
but he adds: 'revelation to that person only' (1995a: 668). He means: only a
revelation to Moses, not to liS. What we know about revelation is always mediated
by what I have before indicated as 'religious leaders'. So anyone believing the Ten
Commandment to be true does not do this on account of God's authority but on the
basis of the authority of Moses.22
Kant's position does not fundamentally differ from that of Paine, but he is at
pains to put it far less bluntly than Paine did. What both writers have in common is
a skeptic attitude towards what comes 'from above'. Even if the command seems
to be a command of God - as Abraham appeared to think - we have to leave the
possibility open that we ourselves make a mistake in interpreting the command or
that the religious leader makes a mistake.23
21 'Dass einem Menschen, seines Religionsglaubens wegen, das Leben zu nehmen
unrecht sei, ist gewiB.' Kant 1981b: 861.
22 Similar arguments, although more cautiously formulated and represented by the
figures in a dialogue, we find in Hume 1948.
23 'dass hier ein Irrtum vorwalte.' 1981[... ]: 861.
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Now, what would the theoreticians of the Divine Command Theory answer to
Kant? And more importantly: do they have an answer?
I think they have. What Abraham and Phinehas would answer to the great
philosopher from Koningbergen is that there is a contradiction between what he
pretends to be doing and what he is actually doing. What Kant pretends to be
doing is trying to determine the will of God but once he decides that he will never
accept injunctions as 'divine' in the sense of coming from God that violate moral
conscience, he is actually establishing moral conscience as his final arbiter, not
God. So de facto Kant accepts only moral autonomy as his guiding principle.
It is very clear that the theoreticians of the divine command approach make
objections to this. For the final result of Kant's approach will be that he simply
eradicates all elements from the theological heritage that do not fit in with his
Enlightenment philosophy, they will respond.
The dilemma we should confront Kant with is the following. 'Is it possible that
an interpretation of one of the injunctions of Holy Scripture leads to something
that would horrifY us from a moral point of view?' To this question Kant will
answer 'no'. In the Critique of Practical Reason he writes: 'Religion is the
recognition of all duties as divine commands' (1956: 134). That seems to be the
language of the divine command theory. But that is only appearance. The reason
why there is only a superficial and no real similarity to the divine command theory
is because for Kant what is a moral duty cannot be decided by simply listening to
the voice of God or read His Scripture. Our moral duty has to be delineated purely
by philosophical reasoning. The outcome of that reasoning Kant calls a 'divine
command'. That implies that the 'divine command' is not the startingpoint of his
moral reasoning, but the frnal result. Kant first follows his moral reasoning and the
result is sanctified as 'divine'. That implicates that from the perspective of Kant
God is not legislating for man, man is legislating for God. Or, to put the same
matter in different words, religion is not the basis for morality but the other way
round: morality is the basis for religion. Lewis White Beck sums up the position
of Kant with the words: 'Any religion that requires anything of man other than
earnest and conscientious morality is mere superstition and idolatry' (1997: 76).
This is something the adherents of divine command simply cannot accept.
They see this as an unacceptable limitation of the divine personality. God is a
person. God must have a 'choice'. If God cannot do otherwise than he actually
does, he would be no person. He would be an automaton, a 'Dieu machine', a
Spinozistic Deus sive Natura, not the theistic personal God that we encounter in
the scriptural tradition.24
Here the response from the side of divine command moralists appears to be
convincing, I would say.
As I said before, Kant always tried to avoid trouble with the authorities. He
certainly did not volunteer for martyrdom. This attitude might be put with the
words of Montaigne: 'I shall support the good side as far as (but, if possible,
24 Analogous to LaMettrie's L 'homme machine. See LaMettrie 1974.
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excluding) the stake' (1991: 894). So Kant struggles to reconcile his predilection
for moral autonomy with confessional orthodoxy.
Kant addressed the same question five years later in Der Streit der Fakultaten
(1798) (1981a: 267-393), and here, as he had done in Die Religion innerhalb
der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft, he dwells on the problem ofAbraham. In Der
Streit he assures us that if God seems to speak to humankind ('wenn Gott zum
Menschen wirklich sprache') we can never be sure that it is God who is speaking.
Kant uses what can be called 'the agnostic argument': man will never be able to
understand Infinite God with his finite capacities (1981a: 333). In some cases it is
even possible to contend with absolute certainty that we cannot hear the voice of
God, to wit: if what is commanded flatly violates the moral law. That voice may
sound majestic, Kant tells us, but it should be considered as a fraud (1981a: 333).
As an example of this state of affairs Kant refers to Abrahams' offer and calls
this a myth. The poor unknowing child himselfbrought the wood for the fire, Kant
writes. Abraham should have answered: 'that I should not kill my son is clear, but
that you, appearing to me as God are really God, is far from sure, not even ifyour
voice would yell loudly from heaven' (1981a: 333, see also Bloch 1968: 121).
It is remarkable how such a 'dry' author as Immanue1 Kant talks in such
emotional terms about the story ofAbraham. And what is remarkable: he calls it
'a myth'.
This is strong language. Kant qualifies a central part of Holy Scripture as
mythological.
The Story of Jephthah
The story of Abraham continued to fascinate commentators through the ages.
Theoreticians who felt sympathy for the central message of theism sometimes
pointed out that on the supreme moment Abraham was not required to offer his
son. Can't we interpret the story in such a way that God is not requiring but, on
the contrary, against human offers? But that is not a very convincing interpretation
when we realize that the story ofAbraham is no isolated incident. The story of Job
is similar. Job is 'tested' by Satan with knowledge and compliance of God. The
most direct similarity with Abraham's offer however is to be found in the story of
Jephthah.
Jephthah was a 'mighty warrior' (Judges 11: 1) and he lead Israel in a struggle
against the Ammonites. In this struggle he was helped by the Lord. Jephthah made
a vow to the Lord and said: 'If you will give the Ammonites into my hand, then
whatever comes out from the doors ofmy house to meet me when I return in peace
from the Ammonites shall be the Lord's, and I will offer it up for a burnt offering'
(Judges 29: 30-32).
Jephthah went to war and the Lord gave the Ammonites into Jephthah's hand.
The Ammonites 'were subdued before the people ofIsrael' (Judges 29: 33).
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Then Jephthah came to his home at Mizpah. And what came out from the door
of his house? 'His daughter came out to meet him with tambourines and with
dances'. Jephthah, so the Bible tells us, 'did with her according to his vow that he
had made' (Judges 29:39).
These are strange stories. The similarity between the story ofAbraham offering
Isaac and that of Jephthah offering his daughter is striking. Both appear prepared
to offer their children. In both stories the children willingly comply. There is only
one difference though. Abraham had not to offer Isaac at the last moment, but the
daughter of Jephthah is actually sacrificed25 Another difference is that Abraham
did not volunteer for a vow to God, whereas Jephthah more or less caused his own
unfortunate destiny because he himself sought the help of the Lord for securing
his military success. Also making a vow that you will offer 'whatever comes out
from the doors' of your house is somewhat strange. What comes out of the doors
of your house? Usually your wife, your children - in short: your own family. So it
is hard to avoid the conclusion that Jephthah knowingly and willingly jeopardized
his own kind for the sake of military success.
Voltaire was abhorred about this. He wrote about the 'abominable Jewish
people' who complied to human sacrifices. They were barbarians and on the basis
of those barbaric laws they were prepared to offer their children (1961: 487).
Is this an unduly harsh verdict by Voltaire? Not from the perspective of an
autonomous ethics ofcourse, but from the perspective of divine command ethics it
is certainly not barbaric to conform to the commands ofa perfect and eternal God
that sometimes requires us to do things that from our limited point of reference
seem impossible to justifY. For the divine command theorist these consequences
are 'all in the game': 'For as the heavens are higher than the earth, so are my ways
higher than your ways and my thoughts than your thoughts' (Isaiah 55: 8-9).
Most commentators chose to ignore the tension between a central tenet of
theism and morality. That is especially prevalent among the commentators who
want to modernize Holy Scripture and revise holy tradition without telling openly
what they are doing.
Kant's Legacy in Nineteenth-Century German Theology:
'Kulturprotestantismus'
The tradition initiated by Kant we may call 'the modernist tradition' in religious
thought. The term 'modernism' covers a variety ofmovements and tendencies, but
I will use it here to designate as the attempt to take moral autonomy in religious
thought as a starting point but at the same time trying to avoid an open conflict
25 Although there are some interpretations that this did not actually take place:
'the fact that his daughter was mourning the fact that she would never marry, instead of
mourning that she was about to die (Judges 11 :37) possibly indicates that Jephthah gave her
to the tabernacle as a servant instead of sacrificing her' (www.GotQuestions.org).
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with divine command ethics. Modernism in this sense is an attempt to reconcile
modem science and philosophy with religious traditions. When applied to the
theory of interpretation modernism means that the holy text and the holy tradition
are interpreted against the background of autonomous morality. Sometimes
commentators standing in the modernist tradition belittle the significance of
autonomous reasoning and rationalism and the Enlightenment tradition. They want
us to believe that the true core of the theistic religions had always been respect for
moral autonomy and the Enlightenment values. And because this is their basic
conviction it colors all their interpretations. In some cases these interpretations
are rather weird. An unprejudiced reading of the stories of Abraham, Jephthah,
Phinehas and Job cannot ignore that there is a strong element of heteronomy and
divine command ethics in the holy Book and the holy tradition. But according to
the more cautious or conciliatory voices among the modernists the autonomy of
ethics is not an idea that germinated in a non-religious context and has gradually
gained ground in the religious traditions, rather it is an inherent element of it. We
find this tendency in Immanuel Kant but, for instance, also in the great French
writer, politician and historian Chateaubriand (1768-1848).
Chateaubriand presents an eloquent apology of Christianity in his book Genie
du Christianisme (1802; 1978), published nine years after Kant's Die Religion
innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft. Contrary to Kant, Chateaubriand
presents a scathing critique of the Enlightenment authors. If we know that Kant
wrote a superb vindication of the principles of the Enlightenment in his famous
essay What is Enlightenment? (1981c: 53--61) the difference with Chateaubriand
could not be greater, so it seems. But that is only superficiaj,26 as we will notice as
soon as we delve into the matter a little further.
One of the most important elements of the Enlightenment was the doctrine of
moral autonomy. This is correctly described by the great historian of philosophy,
P.C. Copleston, as the main contribution of the Enlightenment to the cultural
heritage of mankind. What the Enlightenment authors accomplished, so writes·
Copleston, is that they separated ethics from metaphysics and theology (1960: 18).
There was certainly difference in tone between the moral idealism of a Diderot
and the utilitarian approach of LaMettrie, so Copleston tells us, but what all
Enlightenment philosophers had in common is that they wanted 'to set morality
on its own feet' (1960: 18).
If this is right - and I think it is right - every criticism of the Enlightenment
should address this particular issue: can morality be put on its own feet?
What we see, however, in the tradition of what we may call 'moderate theism'
is that one tries to belittle the significance of the Enlightenment and tries to
insinuate that moral autonomy is an inherent element of the theistic tradition. This
is what we find in Chateaubriand. What he tries to do in Genie du Christianisme
is, he tells us, 'ne pas prouver que le christianisme est excellent, parce qu'il vient
26 As Joseph de Maistre was well aware of. See what he writes on Chateaubriand in
Maistre 2007: 1147.
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de Dieu; mais qu'il vient de Dieu, parce qu'il est excellent' (1978: 469). So
Chateaubriand's point of departure is, just like Kant, moral autonomy, not divine
command ethics. But what he does not realize (at least he does not tell) is that
unknowingly he subscribes to the central tenets of the position he professes to
criticize: the Enlightenment. Chateaubriand is an adherent of the Enlightenment
philosophy malgre lui.
Let me summarize the central line ofmy argument and my conclusions so far.
I started with hard cases in law. As I said before: hard cases are so hard because
the strict application of the rules of the law would result in a situation that we find
difficult ifnot impossible to accept on moral grounds. Hard cases do not only arise
within a legal context though, but also when religious precepts are applied in a
contemporary context. We have seen that Holy Scripture, like modem penal and
civil law, contains passages that are difficult to reconcile with sound moral sense.
As an example I referred to a prohibition to change your religion. The ancient
precepts are evidently contradictory to modem human rights law and the freedom
of expression as enshrined in most modem constitutions.
What can we do on this? Can we do anything at all? It is clear we can. The
first strategy is simply to do what is required by Holy Scripture. That would mean:
following the text of the Bible and proclaim contemporary moral sense, modem
human rights law and modem constitutions as invalid in so far as these proclaim
the freedom of religion. This is attractive from a dogmatic point of view, but
morally unsatisfactory. It would make believers strangers in the modem world. In
its most extreme consequences it would condone religious terrorism, as the story
ofPhinehas makes clear.
The second strategy is rejecting the pretension that ancient religious texts
could be guiding us in the modem world. This is morally satisfying and would
not make believers strangers in the modem world, but it is unattractive from a
dogmatic point of view. It would proclaim moral autonomy. Believers would be
openly rejecting God's word as Thomas Paine had done in The Age of Reason,
and what serious believer could justify this? The second strategy comes close to
atheism.
So the central dilemma for the modem believer is to avoid both terrorism (first
option) and atheism (second option). He wants to save the holiness of the text
and at the same time avoid the consequences of the hard cases that those texts put
before him. The third strategy is devised to accomplish just that. The third strategy
in dealing with hard cases is adopting the moral autonomy of the second point of
view and the dogmatic right attitude of the first. This pretended reconciliation of
moral autonomy with divine revelation is the gist of the modernist position with
Immanuel Kant as its foremost ideologue.
Modernism was at the centre of German theological thought from Immanuel
Kant onwards and exerted an overwhelming influence in modem culture. In
this article we are not concerned with modernism as such, but especially with
the way it manifests itself in the theory of interpretation. In theological circles
it was defended by Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834). In the nineteenth
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century it developed in what has been called 'liberal Protestantism' or 'cultural
Protestantism' (Kulturprotestantismus). 'From its outset, liberal Protestantism was
committed to bridging the gap between Christian faith and modern knowledge'
(McGrath 1994: 93). What the liberal Protestants did is: 'they demanded a degree
of freedom in relation to the doctrinal inheritance of Christianity on the one hand,
and traditional methods of biblical interpretation on the other' (McGrath 1994:
93). Elements of Christian belief which they regarded as seriously out of line
with modern cultural values were treated in the following way. First, they were
abandoned (as happened with the doctrine of original sin). Second, they were
reinterpreted in a manner more conducive to the spirit of the age (McGrath 1994:
93). One of the main representatives of the movement, Albrecht Benjamin Ritschl
(1822-1889), saw history as a divinely guided process toward perfection. In the
course of history some people are bearers of special divine insights. Jesus Christ
was such a person.
The most representative figures of the movement were, apart from Ritschl,
Wilhelm Herrmann (1846-1922), Adolf von Harnack (1851-1930) and (in a
certain sense) Ernest Troeltsch (1865-1923). A contemporary representative is
Paul Tillich (1886-1965).
Mark Lilla calls those liberal protestants in his overview of the tradition of
political theology 'immensely learned scholars whose greater theological-political
ambitions were usually clearer than the reasoning they used to achieve them'
(2007: 230). This is a devastating observation.
What is the background of their thinking? According to the liberal Protestants
there could be no contradiction between Christianity and modern German life.
Now, they could be right in this although we should never forget to mention the
reason why this was the case. This was the case because they simply (1) ignored
all the problematical texts I have quoted before or (2) 'interpreted' those texts in
such a way that all contradictions with modem thought evaporated. Only thanks
to their own interventions and interpretative work they could contend that, in the
words ofMark Lilla, 'there was an organic connection between Protestantism and
modernity, a shared conception of the values of individuality, moral universalism,
reason, and progress' (2007: 231). Harnack had put it in his What is Christianity
(1900) as follows: 'Law or ordinances or injunctions bidding us forcibly to alter
the conditions ofthe age in which we happen to be living are not to be found in the
Gospels' (Harnack quoted in Lilla 2007: 231).
Modernist movements did not only gain ground within Protestant Christianity
but within the Jewish tradition as well. A great name was Hermann Cohen
(1842-1918), professor in Marburg and together with Natorp the founder of the
Marburger School of Neo-Kantianism. In his posthumously published treatise
Religion der Vernunft aus den Quellen des Judentums or Religion ofReason out
of the Source ofJudaism (1919) he argued that Judaism is both the source and
quintessence of all ethical monotheism. It was Kant again who was helpful to
establish this conviction. Cohen followed Kant accepting that the core of religion
was following the moral law and 'that religious practice can be justified only
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so long as it actualizes that law in social life, without straying beyond reason's
bounds' (quoted in Lilla 2007: 240). Cohen censured Kant, however, because the
great German thinker had overlooked that his convictions about the moral law and
moral freedom 'had derived' from Judaism. Kant could hear in Judaism only the
brute commands ofheteronomous laws and he was deafto the profound modernity
of Judaism.
What Cohen did not understand (and this is crucial), is that from an ethical
point of view it is irrelevant where our moral precepts come from (the historical
origin). What counts is how they can be justified (the justification of our moral
beliefs).27 And once we have stated the dilemma in these terms, the conclusion is
inevitable: they are either justified as expressions of the will of God as manifested
in revelation or they are justified as conforming to the moral law. Either religion is
the basis for ethics or ethics is the basis for religion. Cohen and other modernists
obfuscated the issue by pretending that the religious tradition could never contradict
our moral ideas. He said: 'There is comfort and hope for us in the fact that the
moral ideas ofour religion are in full accord with the exemplary ethics of the new
era ushered in by the French Revolution' (quoted in Lilla 2007: 240). Comforting
this certainly was, but was it rational to believe such a thing? It would be nothing
short ofa miracle ifancient religious texts would be in 'full accord' with the values
and rights as exemplified in the French Declaration des Droits de I'Homme et du
Citoyen. Such a naIve or optimistic conviction could only be held by people who
unconsciously or deliberately ignore the passages we have quoted before.
In one respect Cohen was right though. He was right when he implicitly
criticized that the liberal Protestants unjustifiably elevated their point ofview (i.e.,
Christianity) as compatible with modem moral ideas while insinuating that this
could not be the case for the Jewish religion.28 But for the rest Cohen and the liberal
Protestants shared the same illusions. They defended that there was some kind
of pre-established harmony between their religions and modernity and they both
obfuscated that the miraculous harmony between their religion and modernism
was not a fact of nature but the product of their own blinkers and the application
of what we could call the 'trick of interpretation'. Therefore Mark Lilla is right
(although for somewhat different reasons than he himself advances) when he calls
the convictions of the modernists 'extraordinarily naIve'. He writes: 'Neither
Troeltsch nor Cohen thought that the destructive forces within biblical religion,
which had surfaced repeatedly in premodern Jewish and Christian history, could
ever again pose a threat' (2007: 243).
Calling the modernists 'extremely naIve' may sound a bit harsh. For we have
to remind ourselves that modernist 'interpretation' is the only strategy left for a
believer who wants to avoid both the 'terrorist' and the 'atheist' option of the first
and second approach to deal with hard cases. There simply is no other way out
for the modem believer than pretend that Holy Scripture is a 'living text' sending
27 See on the justification of ethical beliefs Brandt 1959: 241-71.
28 Another scholar combating this view was Renan 1887: 341-74.
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out different messages to different people in different times. So the theory of
interpretation intimately connected with liberal Protestantism did not arise as the
product of a harmonious scholarly development but out of a state of emergency.
What the modernist motivated was a heartfelt need: reconciling the religious
tradition with modem moral ideas.
It was Kant who was pivotal in this process of adaptation of religion to the
stem demands of modernity, but a great influence on the theory of interpretation
of liberal Protestantism was F.D. Schleiermacher (1768-1834). The tradition of
thinking that he initiated was 'hermeneutics'.
Whereas Kant initiated the moral autonomy that liberal Protestantism was based
on, Schleiermacher provided the theory ofinterpretation that made it possible for
moral autonomy to prevail in the religious context.
Schleiermacher lectured from 1819 onward on the interpretation of texts and
speech. Initially the theory of hermeneutics supposed that it was possible to grasp
the original meaning of the authors ofa text, but in the subsequent development of
hermeneutics the adherents became more and more sceptical. The interpreter of a
text from a past culture belongs to and is conditioned by his own different culture.
The interpreter always views the past from a particular 'horizon', involving a
particular 'pre-understanding' .29
This hermeneutic tradition made the third option in dealing with hard cases
'salonfahig'. We should not have qualms about reading texts in such a way that
they suit our moral purposes. Again: this may sound as a fierce criticism ofthe third
approach but we always have to remind ourselves that there is no other option left
for the serious believer. Motivated by the wish to avoid both terrorism and atheism
he has to be an 'interpreter'.
But should we say that the same logic that drives believers and theologians in
the direction of hermeneutics is also compelling for legal scholars? Do we have
to interpret legal texts in the same was as theologians do with religious texts? Are
legal interpreters, just like religious interpreters, more or less forced to see their
central texts (laws, constitutions, treaties) as inalterable Holy Scripture that can
only be modernized by the interpretation techniques of the third strategy? It is an
element of historical truth that the development of legal theory has followed the
same pattern as we can discern in theology, but the question is whether this was
necessary. In the remainder of this chapter I will contend that the theory of legal
interpretation has uncritically followed the same course as the theory of religious
interpretation. Why this is the case can be easily understood. Fundamental legal
texts like a Constitution have some resemblance to a holy text as the Bible or
Qur'an. But how far the analogy goes is open to discussion.
29 The most important contribution to henneneutics in the twentieth century was
Gadamer 1975.
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The Constitution as Sacred Text (and the Judiciary as Priesthood)
One ofthe classic texts comparingtheAmerican Constitutionto akind ofHoly Scripture
is A Constitutional Faith (1969) by the American Supreme Court Justice Rugo Black
(1886-1971). The American Constitution is the foundational text ofthe United States,
Black tells us. Re writes about his 'deep respect and boundless admiration and love
for our Constitution and the men who drafted it' (1969: 65). Black continues: 'The
Constitution is my legal Bible; its plan ofour government is my plan and its destiny is
my destiny. I cherish every word ofit, from the first to the last, and I personally deplore
even the slightest deviation from its least important commands. '30
The similarity between Bible and Constitution is the focus of an impressive
and ever growing literature. The philosopher Richard Taylor (1919-2003) draws a
parallel between the American judiciary and priesthood and he contends that one
of the resemblances between the two priesthoods is that each rests its authority in
part upon a body of literature, the central part ofwhich is deemed somehow sacred
or inspired. 'The similarity in the roles of the Bible and the Constitution within
the religious and the secular priesthood is worth stressing. Priests, for example, as
well as lesser functionaries in the church, swear their belief in and fidelity to the
Bible, treating it as sacred, not just for its content, but in its own right' (1889: 159).
The Bible is not only a 'source of inspiration' or an 'important book' for the priest,
but an object of veneration. And so is the Constitution for the judges. No one who
knows anything about the 'constitutional faith' ofjudges could be surprised about
Justice Rugo Black having a Constitution to accompany him into his grave.
That legal texts as a Constitution have some similarity with religious texts is
clear. The question is, though, what conclusions we have to draw from this. And
another question is how far the similarity goes. Both legal and religious texts are
authoritative, but is it the same authority? This can be doubted. In the case of a
legal text it is the authority of man over man and ultimately of man over himself.
Compliance to legal texts like the law or a Constitution is obedience to oneself, at
least in a democracy. Religious texts, on the other hand, have the pretension to be
binding on the basis of some transcendent authority.
One may put the difference also like this. A legal text is man-made and can
be openly changed by human intervention. So a legal community does not have
to take its resort to 'hermeneutic interpretation' to adapt its legal culture to the
demands of modem times. Religious believers are in a different position. Within
the confines of their theistic worldview, they cannot openly change their religious
document. The only way to do this is operating in a secret manner; religionists are
required to 'interpret' their texts in order to change them.
To make that clear I will elaborate somewhat on the developments that have
made liberal interpretation within legal circles the orthodoxy of the day, just like
liberal Protestantism became dominant among nineteenth-century theologians in
Europe.
30 See on Black's position also Silverstein 1984.
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One of the most outspoken advocates for the idea of a Living Constitution was
the American Supreme Court Justice William Joseph Brennan (1906-1997). His
worldview and manner of interpreting the holy text of the lawyers resembles the
way liberal Protestants treated the Bible. Brennan was associate justice in the
Supreme Court in the period between 1956 till 1990. So he was an active member
ofthe Court during a period of44 years. That is a long period and Brennan exerted
a great influence on the development ofAmerican law.
In 1989 Brennan delivered the H.L.A. Hart Lecture in Jurisprudence and
Moral Philosophy at the University of Oxford. That was one year before his
retirement. In this lecture he looks back on his service at the Court and, more
importantly, he gives a justification for his long-time activist approach on the
bench. The immediate occasion for his lecture was the discussion in Great-Britain
on the question whether it would be wise to enshrine human rights in a specially
written document.31 Brennan asks: 'Why have a bill of rights, that is, some fairly
general codification of civil liberties, at all?' (1989: 425). And because it is not
only a declaration, but a document that can be interpreted by judges his question
is: 'whether an entrenched bill of rights, enforceable against government by
individuals in courts of law, is worth having.' 1989: 427) Brennan's answer to this
question is an unqualified 'yes' and his lecture is actually one long eulogy on the
American legal system, especially ifthe judges consider themselves fit to interpret
the Constitution as a 'Living document'.
Brennanstarts with some observations onthe rights enshrined in the constitution.
He is not against that. And, so he follows (1989: 426):
So long as they are not unduly vague, as I believe the European Convention
and its American counterpart are not, broad formulations of personal rights are
a virtue, because they permit judges to adapt canons of right to situations not
envisaged by those who framed them, thereby facilitating their evolution and
preserving their vitality.
Subsequently Brennan quotes Justice Brandeis (1856-1941), another Supreme
Court justice, though from a previous generation (1916-1939), who once said that
the Constitution is not a 'straitjacket'. Brandeis had said: 'It is a living organism.
As such it is capable of growth - ofexpansion and ofadaptation to new conditions
(... ) Because our Constitution possesses the capacity ofadaptation, it has endured
as the fundamental law ofan ever-developing people' (1989: 426).32
This is the well-known theory of the 'Living Constitution' fonnulated by a
judge who deceased in 1941 but whose ideas not only inspired the Warren Court
(1953-1969) but also the Burger Court (1969-1986). The idea of the Living
31 See on this Zoethout 1998, 2006.
32 Brennan also quotes Bickel 1962: 107.
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Constitution or the Constitution as a Living Document, a Living Text, has been
the orthodoxy of the day for a very long time. Nevertheless, there emerged a
reaction to the liberal interpretation of the Constitution by scholars and judges
who stress the importance ofjudicial restraint, castigating the liberal hermeneutics
as a pretext for arbitrary judicial omnipotence. Names of those 'restrainists' are,
apart from Scalia, William Rehnquist (1976), Robert Bork (1990,2003) and Hugo
Black (1969).
The overwhelming majority of the American scholars and judges are
committed to the school that favours some kind of liberal interpretation, just like
most theologians were advocates of the liberal Protestant approach with regard to
Holy Scripture.
Characteristic for the theory of the living constitution, so it seems, is its great
rhetorical attractiveness. To explain this, let us revoke the imagery that is being
used by its adherents and subsequently try to ascertain whether the popularity ofthe
living Constitution is justified from a more rational and scholarly point of view. To
do this I want to focus for a moment on the words of Brandeis as quoted above.
First: according to Brandeis the Constitution should not be a straitjacket. The
word 'straitjacket' immediately has negative associations. In a straitjacket people
are laced up. But how can a Constitution lace up people? Taken literally this has
no meaning at all, but perhaps we should not take it that way. Does it mean that if
the Constitution does not facilitate judicial law-making we have to consider it a
straitjacket? But in that case Brennan's and Brandeis' use of the word 'straitjacket'
would be nothing less than a aratia pra dama: it is a straitjacket ifthey, the judges,
cannot do with the Constitution whatever they deem appropriate. In that sense the
Constitution may be a straitjacket, but in this sense the Constitution was meant ta
be a straitjacket. Is that not the purpose of all law? If the law was like crystal ball,
to be interpreted in every possible way, it would not be good law, would it?
A second part of the imagery of the rhetoric of the living Constitution is that it
is a 'living organism'. Taken literally, this is a dubious comparison. A Constitution
does not live, like an animal lives or a plant. A Constitution is more like a table
than like a cat. Nevertheless, the imagery of a living Constitution is attractive.
Why? What do we try to convey when we speak of a Constitution as 'living'?
That appears when Brandeis talks about 'growth'. Like an ordinary living
being, also a Constitution has a beginning. The beginning of the Constitution of
the United States was in 1787. But the Constitution that we have now, so Brandeis
(and by implication Brennan) seems to convey to us, is not the same Constitution
as the Americans had in 1787. The Constitution has 'grown' or, to use a more
common metaphor, it has' developed' .
Yet, characteristic of analogies is usually that the people that use them do this
only in a restricted sense. The same is true here. If we would follow the metaphors
of 'growth' and 'development' this would point in the direction of 'death'. All living
beings ultimately die. So if a Constitution is a 'living text', the ultimate consequence
of this would be that this text would die as well. The strange thing is, however, that
the apologists ofthe living Constitution do not seem to subscribe to that position. On
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ilie contrary, ilie imagery of ilie living constitutionnalists seems to have banned out
all deaili. Their Constitution has eternal life, just like the word of God.
This is strange. If iliey would want to secure the eternity of their Constitution
they had rather compare the Constitution with inanimate things, straitjackets for
instance, than elaborate on ilie metaphor of life and organic growth.
Anyhow, that is not what the apologists for the living text do. They think
the Constitution has to be adapted to 'new conditions', as Brandeis tells us.
Perhaps a Darwinian comparison is illuminating here. The advocates of ilie living
Constitution seem to iliink that the constitution, like a species, has to adapt itself
to ilie changing circumstances. If not, the species will die out, and so will ilie
Constitution.
Let us now leave Brandeis and return to Brennan. That is necessary because
it is Brennan who explicitly says something that is only implicitly present in ilie
quote from Brandeis. Brennan also tells us who has to develop the constitution.
That is not the legislative power, it is the judiciary.
This is far from self-evident. In the wake ofattractive imagery of 'life', 'growfu'
and 'development' an altogeilier different idea is smuggled in. This idea is that one
specific institution should do all ilie developing, i.e. the judiciary. As I said: this is
not self-evident. One could adopt all the rhetorical imagery of 'living', 'organism',
'adapting to changing circumstances' and so on and so forth, and still contend iliat
it is ilie legislative power and not ilie judiciary that has to take ilie leading role. But
iliat is not ilie opinion ofBrennan and other liberal interpreters. He brings iliat to our
attention when he writes that general rights are a virtue 'because iliey permit judges
to adapt canons ofright to situations not envisaged by iliose who framed iliem' .
Especially the word 'because' requires our attention. Brennan does not
contend iliat he subscribes to a written declaration of civil rights although iliey
comprise general formulations. No, he favours such a declaration exactly because
it comprises iliose majestic generalities. That is to say: because those 'canons of
right' make it possible to make decisions iliat ilie framers of ilie Constitution had
not foreseen.
This is a rather revealing formulation from the perspective of ilie critics of ilie
idea of a living constitution. Brennan seems satisfied wiili the Constitution not
because what is in it but what is omitted. And the reason is that because of those
omissions it is possible for judges to apply 'canons of right'. From the further
development of his lecture it appears iliat Brennan is especially satisfied wiili
iliose rights of ilie American people that ilie framers of the Constitution did not
foresee and did not lay down in the constitution.
A great part of Brennan's lecture is dedicated to the 'new rights' that were
invented by the judges on occasion oftheir interpreting the Constitution (or should
we say: despite the Constitution?). He refers to Brown v. Board of Education
(1954), an important ruling from ilie Warren-period in which the Court stated that
the 'separate but equal' provisions for the black community were considered to
be 'inherently unequal'. Another ruling iliat Brennan is very eniliusiastic about
is Griswold v. Connecticut (1965) that made it unconstitutional to prohibit
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contraceptives for adults. A further ruling that Brennan mentions to illustrate
his approving attitude of the Constitution is Mapp v. Ohio (1961) that made it
impossible to use evidence that was illegally acquired. Another important ruling
was Miranda v. Arizona (1966), in which, so Brennan says: 'we held that the
police must inform a person subjected to custodial interrogation of his right to
remain silent'. And last but not least, ofcourse, Roe v. Wade from 1973, in which a
right to abortion was deduced from the right to privacy that was introduced in the
Griswold case some ten years earlier.
It would not be true to say that Brennan is completely uncritical about the Court.
He certainly has some points of criticism. But in those cases he is dissatisfied
because some hard cases have not been decided by the court, although they should.
For instance Brennan thinks that capital punishment will one day be abolished by
the court. Brennan is against capital punishment. So one day the court shall have
to decide that the death penalty is a 'cruel and unusual punishment' and therefore
violating the eighth amendment.
Gradually it must have dawned upon the British audience assembled to listen
to Supreme Court Justice William Brennan in 1989 what his advocacy of a bill
of rights means. It means that the judiciary will be put in a position to invent
more and more rights.33 Brennan is fully confident that the judges have to take
the lead in this. Path breaking rulings like Brown v. Board ofEducation 'met with
determined resistance thirty-five years ago', Brennan tells us enthusiastically,
but that resistance has dwindled down (1989: 432). And so it is with all the
other situations in which the judiciary took the lead. Some. years later there is
always 'almost universal acceptance'. Take Roe v. Wade, 'establishing a woman's
fundamental right to choose whether to bear a child'. Who would not be happy
with that decision after some elapse of time?34
Antonin Scalia on the Living Constitution
Although it would not be right to say that the school of liberal interpretation that
Brennan is such an outspoken voice of reigns unbridled, it is fair to say that the
liberals were and are in the majority. The most vocal contemporary voices against
the theory of the living Constitution are Robert Bork and Antonin Scalia.
I will now give an overview ofScalia's ideas on interpretation before elaborating
on the difference between religious and legal interpretation that is the focal point
of my argument.
The most comprehensive exposition of Scalia's view on statutory and
constitutional interpretation we find in his Common Law Courts in a Civil Law
System The Role ofthe UnitedStates Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution
33 See for a critique on this Wellman 1999, Glendon 1991.
34 That this is too optimistic appears from the continuous dissatisfaction ofChristian
groups with Roe. See on this Linker 2006 and Neuhaus 1997.
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and Laws (1997). Scalia defends a textualist approach and rejects the theory of
interpretation favoured by the idea ofthe 'Living Constitntion'.
To understand the sorry predicament of American constitntional theory and
practice one has to gauge into the background of American legal history. The
American system is derived from the common law approach. And the common
law is not so much 'customary law' as 'law developed by the judges' (1997: 3).
In the very infancy ofAnglo-Saxon law it could have been thought that the courts
were mere expositors of generally accepted social practices, but in the further
development ofAnglo-Saxon law this was certainly not the case: any equivalence
between custom and common law ceased to exist. That immediately appears if
we read Oliver Wendell Hohnes' well-known and influential book The Common
Law (1963). This mainly deals with individual court decisions and the judges who
wrote them. The law was created by the judges.
This common law approach is an important influence on American freshmen
entering a judicial career. They learn the law not by reading statntes, but by
studying judicial opinions. How exciting! This explains why first-year law school
is so exhilarating. Scalia writes: 'it consists ofplaying common-law judge' (1997:
7). It is like playing the king, devising out of the brilliance of one's own mind,
those laws that ought to govern mankind (1997: 7).
The Idea ofthe Living Constitution is both Undemocratic and Not in Accordance
with the Rule ofLaw
Contrary to Brennan, Scalia contends that the problem with this approach is that
it not so easily fits in with both democracy and the rule of law. Why that is the
case had already been made clear by one of the adherents of the law-codification
movement, Robert Rantoul, in a speech in 1836. Rantoul wrote: 'Judge-made law
is ex post facto law, and therefore unjust. An act is not forbidden by the statute
law, but it becomes void by judicial construction. The legislature could not effect
this, for the Constitntion forbids it. The judiciary shall not usurp legislative power,
says the Bill of Rights: yet it not only usurps, but runs riot beyond the confines of
legislative power' (quoted in Scalia 1997: 10). According the Rantoul judge-made
law is 'special legislation' . The judge makes law by 'extorting from precedents
something they do not contain' (1997: 11).
Scalia has no quarrel with the common law and its process. What he criticizes,
though, is the attitude of the common law judge extending its influence on
contemporary American constitutional law. We live in an age of legislation and
most new law is statntory law. Nevertheless the attitnde of the common law judge
is still exerting a massive influence on the way we interpret statutes and also
the Constitntion. Many people - ordinary people but lawyers and constitutional
scholars as well - see the Constitntion as a charter for judges to develop an
evolving common law of freedom of speech, of privacy rights, and the like (1997:
13). This is not right. What we need is a science of statntory interpretation. The
most important question is: what are we looking for when we construe a statnte?
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The Intent ofthe Legislature is not Relevant
One of the answers to this question is that we have to look to the 'intent of the
legislature'. But that is too subjectivistic, according to Scalia. What we have to
look for is some sort of 'objective intent', specified as: 'the intent that a reasonable
person would gather from the text of the law' (1997: 17).
Why should we look for objective intent and not subjective intent? Mainly:
because only the first is compatible with democratic government. It is undemocratic
and even unfair to have the meaning of law determined by what the lawgiver
meant instead of what the lawgiver promulgated. Unfair because: 'Government
by unexpressed intent is tyrannical' (1997: 17). But it is also not compatible with
democratic theory that laws mean whatever they ought to mean, and that unelected
judges decide what that is (1997: 22). Congress can enact foolish statutes as well
as wise ones, and it is not for the courts to decide which is which and rewrite the
former (1997: 20). A result of Scalia's view that the objective indication of the
words, rather than the intent of the legislature, is what constitutes the law leads
him to the conclusion that legislative history should not be used as an authoritative
indication of a statute's meaning. He sides with Chief Justice Taney who wrote:
'The law as it passed is the will of the majority of both houses, and the only mode
in which that will is spoken is in the act itself' (1997: 30). Or Felix Frankfurter
who wittily remarked: 'I should concur in this result more readily if the Court
could reach it by analysis of the statute instead ofby psychoanalysis of Congress'
(1997: 30).
Historical research may be necessary, though, but then not to ascertain the
drafter's intent but to gauge the original meaning of the text. 'What I look for in
the Constitution is precisely what I look for in a statute: the original meaning ofthe
text, not what the original draftsmen intended' (1997: 38). So Scalia gives equal
weight to Jay's pieces in The Federalist, and to Jefferson's writing, as to those of
Madison and Hamilton, although only Madison and Hamilton were framers. What
is important is that Jay, Jefferson, Madison and Hamilton were contemporaries
and we have to interpret the text of the Constitution according to the meaning of
the words used in the text at the time the Constitution was adopted. What is crucial
to construe the law is not 'current meaning' ofthe words (the meaning those words
have in our time) but 'original meaning' (the meaning those words had when the
Constitution was enacted). For it is that meaning that the American people had
voted for when they enacted the Constitution.
Against the Living Constitution and in Favour of Textualism' and 'Originalism'
Here Scalia opposes the idea of the Living Constitution. He sees this as 'the
common law returned' but only much more powerful (1997: 38). The common law
attitude applied to contemporary constitutional theory means that the Constitution
might mean what it ought to mean. Is it morally desirable that there is a right
to die? So, there is. Not the text of the Constitution is decisive, but whether the
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judges want such a right. 'If it is good, it is so. Never mind the text that we are
supposedly construing; we will smuggle these new rights in (... )' (1997: 39).
Scalia is vehemently opposed to a theory - for instance defended by Eskridge
in a book on statutory interpretation - that it is proper for a judge who applies a
statute to consider 'not only what the statute means abstractly, or even on the basis
of legislative history, but also what it ought to mean in terms of the needs and
goals of our present day society' (1997: 22).
The judge has to follow the text, because the text is the law (1997: 22). This
philosophy of interpretation is called 'textualism' by Scalia (1997: 23). So his
theory ofinterpretation is based on two pillars. First: the text is central (textualism).
Second: the text has to be interpreted according to what the words meant on the
moment that the text was made (originalism).
Presupposed to Scalia's whole approach is a theory about language, meaning
and interpretation. This is expressed clearly in the passage where Sca1ia contends
that the good textualist is not a literalist, neither a nihilist. 'Words do have a limited
range ofmeaning, and no interpretation that goes beyond that range is permissible'
(1997: 24).
Liberal evolutionists tend to see the march ofthe Court in terms ofa progressive
liberalisation ofmen from the tentacles ofoppression, but Scalia underscores that
creating new restrictions on democratic governments requires very good reasons.
The liberals take this very lightly. The future agenda ofconstitutional evolutionists
is mostly more of the same: the creation of new restrictions upon democratic
government, rather than the elimination of old ones (1997: 42). But shouldn't the
Constitution be changeable, liberals will be inclined to answer Scalia and other
originalists and textualists? As a matter of fact: no. The whole purpose of the
Constitution is to prevent change. The aim of making a Constitution is to entrench
certain rights in such a manner that future generations cannot readily take them
away (1997: 40).35 And if the Constitution has to change, we should follow the
difficult procedure that the Constitution itself describes. People who complain that
this would make constitutional change more difficult or even virtually impossible
may be right but they misjudge that precisely this is the purpose ofa Constitution:
resistance against easy change.
What opponents of textualism and originalism present as a problem with this
theory is exactly its great advantage. As things now stand, Scalia writes, the state
and federal government may apply capital punishment or abolish it, permit suicide
or forbid it. But when capital punishment is held to violate the Eight Amendment
this is not longer the case. Then all flexibility with regard to those matters will
be gone. Scalia concludes: devotees of The Living Constitution do not seek to
facilitate change but to prevent it (1997: 42). Perhaps society as a whole is happy
35 The classic discussion on this point was between Edmund Burke, stressing the
need to conserve the original plan of the Constitution, and Thomas Paine stressing that
we cannot be governed by the 'dead hand of the past'. See on this Burke 1982 and Paine
1995b.
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and pleased with what the Supreme Court did, but we should not pretend that some
of the decisions of the Supreme Court did not eliminate a liberty that previously
existed (1997: 44).
The most glaring defect of the concept of the Living Constitution to Scalia is
that there is no agreement as to what is to be the guiding principle ofthe evolution.
The evolutionists are divided into as many camps as there are individual views
of the good. Here there is a great difference with the originalist. The originalist
knows at least what he is looking for: the original meaning of the text (1997: 45).
For the evolutionist the Constitution is not a text like other texts. It means not
what it says or what it was understood to mean, but what it should mean in the
light ofwhat are called the 'evolving standards of decency that mark the progress
of maturing society' (1997: 46). Scalia rejects that.
Legal Interpretation and Religions Interpretation: Not the Same
Let us now, after having delineated the main features of Scalia's theory of legal
interpretation, return to the comparison between legal and religious interpretation.
Suppose we should apply textualism and originalism to the Bible or the Qur'an. We
have seen with regard to the Bible: that would lead to disastrous consequences."
It would lead us to condoning the sacrifice of children (Abraham, Jephthah) or the
violent overthrow of legitimate authority (Phinehas). So every serious believer
who wants to avoid being convicted for murder or sedition and at the same time
uphold the claim that the text is 'holy' (and accordingly has authority over us), is
forced to the conclusion that those 'hard cases' have a hidden meaning that can
only be disclosed by focussing on some 'spiritual meaning'. And that 'spiritual
meaning' has to mean sometimes the complete opposite of what a textualist and
originalist approach would lead to in order to acquire an acceptable result. Only
by concentrating on a 'spiritualist meaning' it may be possible to prevent that we
have to bring children's offers at God's command.
Jesus Christ was perhaps well aware ofthis. Although pretending to be a sincere
textualist who had not come to abolish the law and the prophets (Matthew 5: 17),
he continued: 'For I tell you, unless your righteousness exceeds that of the scribes
and Pharisees, you will never enter the kingdom of heaven' (Matthew 5: 20).
It seems Christ is struggling in this passage with the eternal dilemma ofall liberal
Protestants: how can we remain faithful to Holy Scripture and at the same time
avoid stoning women, offering children, slaying apostates and other problematic
commands from Scriptureand Jesus Christ, just like all liberal Protestants, uses the
traffic island of 'interpretation'. He pretends that 'not an iota, not a dot' will be
changed (Matthew 5: 18) from the law, and he says 'whoever relaxes one ofthe least
of these commandments and teaches others to do the same will be called least in the
36 With regard to the Qur'an as well, but for my argumeut the analysis of one Holy
book suffices.
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kingdom of heaven', but in fact he changes commandments on stoning women to
something more acceptable by referring to 'righteousness' (Matthew 5: 20).
The advocates of Liberal Protestantism in the legal context or the proponents
of the Living Constitution (Brennan cum suis) try to make us believe that what has
happened in the religious context should also be done in the legal context: a move
away from textualism to more 'open' approaches of the text." This misapplied
analogy between religious interpretation and legal interpretation seems convincing
once we take the comparison between legal Holy Scripture and religious Holy
Scripture too far. However, we have to remind ourselves: legal scripture is only
'holy' in the sense that the Constitution in 1787 was adopted after an extensive
discussion in the country, by a qualified majority, and that the framers of the
Constitution were very able men and that the content of the Constitution is very
important for the country.38 But the men who framed the Constitution, although
wise,'" were not 'infallible' like God is infallible or, according to Catholics, the
pope is infallible.40
Not only the framers are not infallible, the Constitution is not infallible either.
It may be a fine piece of work devised by men, but it remains a human product
with all the imperfections that belong to everything that we, humans, make.
And most important of all: the Constitution can be changed. Not in the sense
of secretly changing it by judicial interpretation, as Brennan favours, but openly,
by revising it through the legislative process, as Scalia advocates. That procedure
is difficult and so it was meant to be, but it is not impossible.
The protagonists ofliberal interpretation in law tend to portray their own stance
as a manifestation of constitutional patriotism (MUller 2007). But that pretension
can be challenged. The greatest constitutional patriot, Hugo Black, was very critical
on liberal interpretation. That is interesting because Black was not, as Scalia and
Bork are, politically associated with conservative or right wing politics.4! Black
simply distrusted judicial power. He mitigated the high expectations that people
had from judicial interventions to remedy social problems (1969: 11). He pointed
out that the Supreme Court had once had completely different political proclivities
and, so Black warned us, 'what has occurred may occur again' (1969: 11). The rule
of law, one of the great ideals ofAmerican constitutional thought, meant much more
to Black than only respect for constitutional rights. 'lntimately it meant law based on
clear and concise rules, which would check the discretion and will of the judiciary'
(1969: 15). So a clear warning for henneneutics it la Brennan.
* * *
37 A classic text in Dutch legal theory effecting this change is Wiarda 1988.
38 See on this Kammen 1987, Wood 1969, Bailyn 1992, 1993.
39 See for a manifestation of the high level of political philosophical wisdom of the
time Madison et al. 1987.
40 See on the background ofthis doctrine Bury 1930: 47 ff.
41 Especially Bork is a fierce critic of liberal political culture. See Bork 1996.
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Let us conclude with a final word on religious scripture as well. Not only the
similarities, but also the differences between legal Scripture and religious Holy
Scripture are manifest. Let us substantiate this insight a bit further by making the
following comparison.
Suppose someone professing to be a serious believer would say that God is
not infallible and that He has made several mistakes in Holy Scripture. God's
ideas on women are outdated, this believer could contend, following Nahed Selim,
Nawal El Saadawi (2007), or Ayaan Hirsi Ali (2007). Or he could state that God's
ideas on homosexuality are not in tune with modem psychological and biological
research on the causes of homosexuality. God should have read Virtually Normal
(1996) by Andrew Sullivan and he could have freed himself from the ordinary
misconceptions about homosexuality. For someone whose nature is to be gay it
would be 'unnatural' to engage in heterosexual behaviour. It is also possible that
this believer would argue that the lack of religious freedom that is manifest in the
passages from Deuteronomy, Judges and Numbers quoted at the beginning of this
treatise does not square with the Universal Declaration ofHuman Rights (1948) or
with the provisions enshrined in the European Declaration of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms (1950). What can we do about this?
What we have to do, so this believer could argue, is literally rewrite Holy
Scripture. In short: we have to revise the passages about Abraham and Isaac,
Jephthah, Phinehas and other passages in such a way that they would be more
acceptable to our contemporary moral taste. Perhaps our imaginary believer could
also propose a procedure for this: we have to install an ethical commission whose
task it is to produce a draft 'Holy Scripture Revised'. Perhaps that document could
even be presented to the national parliament. And parliament could after careful
consideration adopt the new text of Holy Scripture Revised as the public morality
of our time.
What would we say of the proposal of this 'serious believer'? One thing
is sure, the collection of books containing the sacred books of the Jewish and
Christian religions and known as 'the bible', has been purified many times from
passages that were considered to be offensive (Karolides et al. 1999: 181). In 1818
the Swedenborgian John Bellamy published The Holy Bible, Newly Translated,
declaring that no major biblical figure could have committed actions he found
unacceptable. So the translation from Hebrew must be at fault and he revised
passages he considered indecent. More or less the same conviction we encounter
in Dr. Benjamin Boothroyd's The New Family Bible and Improved Version (1824).
The Congregationalist Boothroyd wanted to circumvent :many offensive and
delicate expressions' in the Bible. Even more interventionist was John Watson
who published in the same year The Holy Bible Arranged am]Adapted/or Family
Reading. He replaced offensive passages with his own writing. Also William
Alexander, a Quaker printer, changed words and passages. in his The Holy Bible,
Principally Designed to Facilitate the Audible or Social Reading a/the Sacred
Scriptures that he considered 'not congenial to the present age and refinement'.
What makes this last remark interesting is that apparently Alexander endorsed the
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idea of moral evolution and considered the Bible affected by the less improved
moral ideas of former ages.
That brings us back to my 'serious believer'. Although there are historical
precedents for his approach in rewriting scripture - one of the most notorious
being Jefferson's elimination ofall supernatural elements from the Gospels (1996)
- and although he has some contemporary adherents as well,42 he has also met great
and violent resistance. In former times he would have been stoned as a blasphemer
or heretic and nowadays he would be laughed out of court as a lunatic (at least if
he was so fortunate to be born in a country where blasphemy and heresy are not
cases for capital punishment, as still is a reality in many countries of the world)
(Levi 1993).
In the end, the only option left for our serious believer is to change the text by
'interpretation', not by open revision. Like Jesus Christ had done. But when we
are dissatisfied with our legal documents (our constitutions, our treaties, and our
laws) we can change them, simply by rewriting them, exactly according to the
procedure outlined above.
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